Consider the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) over a distributed storage system where M records are stored across N servers by using an [N, K] MDS code. For simplicity, this problem is usually referred as the coded-PIR problem. The capacity of coded-PIR with privacy against any individual server was determined by Banawan and Ulukus in 2016, i.e.,
I. INTRODUCTION
The private information retrieval (PIR) problem is a canonical problem to study privacy issues that arise from retrieving information from public databases. Specifically, it involves a database containing M records and a user with query interest θ ∈ {1, ..., M }, and the goal is to make the user get the θth record without revealing the index θ. Since in the information theoretic sense, if the database is stored in one server, then the PIR problem has only the trivial solution by downloading all M record, Chor et al. [4] , [5] developed the distributed formulation for PIR problems. That is, suppose the database is stored across N servers, the user finally obtain the θth record by accessing these N servers, and the privacy requirement is to keep θ secret against any subset containing at most T servers. Since then, PIR has become a central research topic in the computer science literature, see [10] for a survey on PIR.
A central issue in PIR is minimizing the communication cost which is usually measured by the total number of bits transferred from the user to the servers (i.e. the query size) and those from servers to the user (i.e. the answer size). In the initial setting of PIR where each record is one bit long, the minimal communication cost achieved by now is M O( 1 log log M ) [8] , [9] . However, it is more common in application scenarios that the size of each file is much larger than M and N , thus the query size is negligible compared to the answer size. As a result, communication cost can be measured by taking only the answer size into account. Specifically, define the rate of a PIR scheme as the ratio between the size of the retrieved file and the answer size, and define the capacity as the supremum of the rate over all PIR schemes. Obviously, the capacity describes the minimum possible download size per unit of retrieved files. Recently, much work has been done on determining the capacity of PIR in various cases. We list in below these results according to the distributed storage is replication-based or coded storage.
Replication-based PIR: That is, each of the N servers stores a replication of the database. In [13] , Sun and Jafar determined the capacity in the non-colluding case (i.e. T = 1) is (1 + 1 N (say, L segments) and querying from each server linear combinations of the transformed segments. We call the number of segments contained in each record (i.e. L) that are necessary for the scheme implementation as sub-packetization of the scheme. Small sub-packetization usually implies simple scheme implementation. However, most known capacity-achieving PIR schemes with asymmetric privacy have exponential sub-packetization, such as the capacity-achieving schemes in [13] and [14] have sub-packetization N M and the capacity-achieving scheme in [1] has sub-packetization KN M . Our research interest is to minimize the sub-packetization for capacity-achieving PIR schemes. In [16] , the authors characterized the optimal download cost for arbitrary record length in replication-based PIR schemes with non-colluding servers. They determined the optimal sub-packetization (they call file size) for capacity-achieving PIR schemes in this case is N M−1 . Recently, we have extended this result to the case of colluding servers [21] and determined the optimal sub-packetization for replication-based PIR schemes with T -colluding servers is N n M−2 , where n = N/gcd(N, T ). In this work, we focus on the sub-packetization for capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes with non-colluding servers. Our main contribution is two-fold: (1) Prove a lower bound on the sub-packetization for all linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes, i.e., L ≥ Kn M−1 , where n = N/gcd(N, K).
(2) Design a general linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR scheme with sub-packetization L = Kn M−1 , which implies that our lower bound is tight and Kn M−1 is the optimal sub-packetization for all linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formlly describe the coded-PIR model studied in this work. For the sake of our proof of the lower bound on sub-packetization, we recall the proof for capacity appeared in [1] . Most of the proofs are put in the appendix. Then the lower bound on sub-packetization is proved in Section III, and the general linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR scheme with optimal sub-packetization is presented in Section IV.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notations and the PIR model
For positive integers m, n ∈ N with m < n, we denote by [m : n] the set {m, m + 1, ..., n}, denote by [n] the set {1, 2, ..., n}. The vectors throughout this paper are always column vectors. For any vector Q = (q 1 , ..., q n ) τ and any subset
τ , where τ is the transposition. Moreover, in order to differentiate indices for the servers from those for the records, we use superscripts as indices for the servers and subscripts for the records. For example, in the below we use Q (i) θ denote the query to the ith server when the user wants the θth record. Throughout the paper we use cursive capital letters to denote random variables, such as W, Q, etc.
Suppose there are M records, denoted by W 1 , . . . , W M . Each record consists of L symbols drawn independently and uniformly from the finite field F q . Therefore,
where H(·) denotes the entropy function. M records are stored in a distributed storage system consisting of N servers Serv (1) , ..., Serv (N) , by an [N, K] MDS storage code. The coded record W j stored at the ith server Serv (i) are denoted by
, the data C Γ stored at them are linearly and stochastically independent. Furthermore, any K servers can exactly recover the whole database, i.e,
A PIR scheme allows a user to retrieve a record, say W θ , for some θ ∈ [M ], from N non-colluding servers with coded records while keeping the desired record index θ secret to any individual server. More formally, a PIR scheme consists of two phases:
• Query phase. Given an index θ ∈ [M ] and some random resources S, the user computes Que(θ, S) = (Q 
Note that S and θ are private information only known by the user, and the function Que(·, ·) is the query function determined by the scheme. We define the query set Q = {Q
which means the user generates his queries without knowing exact content of the coded records.
θ and sends it to the user, where Ans (i) (·, ·) is Serv (i) 's answer function determined by the scheme. Then
Thus to design a PIR scheme is to design the functions Que and Ans (i) such that they satisfy the following two conditions:
which means the user can definitely recover the record W θ after he gets answers from all the servers. (2) Privacy:
which means any individual server knows no information about the index θ. Note that Q
are all the information held by the Serv (i) .
We denote D as the total number of symbols downloaded by the user from all the databases, i. 
θ ) The capacity C C-PIR is the supremum of R over all PIR schemes.
Such a scheme is also called a MDS coded-PIR scheme which is proposed in [1] . It generalizes the PIR schemes in [13] which stands only for the special case of K = 1.
Definition 2. Suppose each record is expressed as a
where
We call L the subpacketization of the PIR scheme. In this paper, we focus on the optimal subpacketization for all linear capacity-achieving MDS coded-PIR schemes and for simplicity we omit the word MDS although all of our results work for general values of K.
B. Capacity of coded-PIR schemes
Note taht the capacity of coded-PIR is determined in [1] , i.e.,
We briefly describe some key lemmas about the capacity, which will be used in next section. We prove the following two lemmas in Appendix A. 
Lemma 5. For a PIR scheme, for any subset
for any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = K, then
where (a), (c) follows from (8) , (b) is due to the fact (7), the inequality (d) comes from the Han's inequality, (e) is due to the fact
θ ′ , W Λ , Q) = 0, which is from (4), (f ) follows from (1) and (2) . Theorem 6. ( [1] ) For coded-PIR with M records and N coded servers, the capacity is
Proof. By the capacity-achieving coded-PIR scheme in [1] , it is sufficient to show that for all PIR scheme, the coded-PIR rate is bounded by R ≤
Suppose that for any θ ∈ [M ],we prove
First, we have
where (a) comes from (2) and (4). Then by Lemma 5, it follows H(A
. By recursively using Lemma 5, we finally have
where (a) comes from (3). Combining with (12) and (13), we immediately obtain (11) .
Finally for any PIR scheme, we know that its rate
Combining with (11), R ≤
III. THE LOWER BOUND ON SUBPACKETIZATION
In this section, we derive a lower bound on subpacketization for all linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes. Namely,
Theorem 7. For all linear capacity-achieving PIR scheme with M records stored in N servers by using a
To determine the lower bound, we need to get some identities about capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes and then some properties of linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes, which are presented in Section III-A and Section III-B respectively. Finally, the proof of Theorem 7 is completed in Section III-C.
A. Some identities for capacity-achieving PIR schemes Lemma 8. For a capacity-achieving coded-PIR scheme, for any
Proof. From (14) in the proof of Theorem 6, we can obtain that
for all coded-PIR schemes. Particularly, for every capacity-achieving coded-PIR scheme, its rate is R =
Combining with (12) and (15), we have
Lemma 9. For a capacity-achieving coded-PIR scheme, for
Proof. For any capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes, these inequalities (9), (10) in the Lemma 5 must be identities. That is, for any θ ∈ Λ,
and for any θ (7), (d) is due to the identity (19) .
B. Properties of linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes
We define a vectorization operator Vec which map a matrix A ∈ F m×n to a row vector Vec(A) ∈ F mn which is composed of all rows of A. For example, suppose A = 1 1 1 0 0 0 , then Vec(A) = 1 1 1 0 0 0 . The following proposition is not difficult to prove and we omit it here.
Moreover, suppose
By Proposition 10 , we can rewrite the equation (6) as follows,
Equivalently,
, we define the sub-matrix
Lemma 11. For a linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ] and nonempty subsets
Proof. Firstly, from identities (20), we have
On the other hand, the left side of (21) 
Moreover, each of the r coordinates is independently and uniformly distributed in F q . Because the entropy is measured by the number of independent symbols in F q , the lemma follows.
Proposition 12. For a linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ], then it holds
Moreover, for any
Proof. Firstly, it follows from (21) and (17) that rank(Q
It is not difficult to verify and we omit it here.
Next we prove Theorem 7.
Proof. We divide our proof in four steps.
(1) To prove L and D have specific forms That is,
. By the definition of linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes, we have that
Since for linear schemes both L and D are integers, thus (26) implies
Combing with (26),
(2) To prove N | L By Lemma 4 and Lemma 11, we have rank( 
). Combing with (25), one can obtain rank(Q
Note that gcd(n, t) = 1, then we know from Lemma 13 that gcd(n M−2 ,
In this section, we present a linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR scheme with the sub-packetization L = Kn M−1 for nontrivial case, i.e., N > K ≥ 1, M > 1. To illustrate the main idea, we begin with three examples. The first two examples are for the case K < N < 2K and the third is for the case N ≥ 2K.
A. Examples Example 1. Suppose M = 2, N = 3 and K = 2. In this case the sub-packetization of our scheme is L = Kn M−1 = 6, each record can be regarded as a 2 × 3 matrix over F q , that is,
which is a generator matrix of a [3, 2] storage MDS code. Then the data stored in
. Without loss of generality, suppose the desired record is W 1 . The scheme is described as follows:
First we randomly permute all columns of each record. Let S 1 , S 2 be two matrices privately chosen by the user independently and uniformly from all 3 × 3 permutation matrices, each row and column of which only contain one nonzero element 1. Then, define
where a i , b i are 2-dimensional column vectors for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Since the a i 's contain information of the desired record W 1 , we call them desired columns. Correspondingly, the b i 's and a i + b j are called interference columns and mixed columns respectively. Note that the each of three kinds of columns is encoded into 3 symbols by a [3, 2] MDS storage code. The answers given by each server consist of all three kinds of related symbols, as displayed in Fig.1 . As similar as the scheme in [21] , the answers are formed by iteratively applying the following two steps: (a1) Combining new desired columns with recoverable interference columns. (a2) Querying new interference columns to enforce records symmetry with each server. We explain these two steps through the example. At first, suppose that the set of recoverable interference columns is empty at the initial state. Hence the user directly download some desired symbols from each server and the related desired columns can be recovered from all desired symbols, as displayed in the first figure of Fig.1 . Then applying Step (a2), the user can obtain the second figure such that all records are symmetry in the queries to each server. That is, there are the same number of columns of all records at each server in the second figure. For example, the user asks for two columns of W 1 from Serv
(1) ,a 1 , a 2 , then he simultaneously asks for two columns of W 2 from Serv Step (a1), the user obtains the third figure. That is, it combines the new desired column a 3 with b 1 , b 2 which as a term to obtain two mixed columns a 3 + b 1 , a 3 + b 2 respectively. Note that there are only two records stored in each server and each satisfies the record symmetry, thus the scheme is complete.
This scheme satisfies the correctness condition. Note that user can directly recover the desired columns a 1 , a 2 while the desired column a 3 can be recovered from the mixed symbols g τ 2 (a 3 + b 2 ), g τ 3 (a 3 + b 1 ) by eliminating the interference columns b 1 , b 2 respectively. On the other hand, the permutation matrix S 1 is invertible, thus the desired record W 1 can be retrieved. Fig. 1 : Query sequence for θ = 1 in the (M = 2, N = 3, K = 2) PIR scheme.
Let us see why privacy condition holds. It is equivalent to show that for any individual server, its query sequence for retrieving W 1 has the same distribution as the query sequence for retrieving W 2 . To generating the query sequence for retrieving W 2 , in our scheme it only need to exchange the position of a and b and preserve subscript at the Fig.1 . That is,
and the corresponding queries is displayed in Fig.2 . For any individual server,such as Serv (2) , and any random permutation 
, thus its query sequence for retrieving W 1 has the same distribution as the query sequence for retrieving W 2 for the server Serv (2) . Similarly, one can find corresponding permutation matrices S ′ 1 , S ′ 2 which have the above property for any individual server. Hence the privacy condition is guaranteed. Finally, the total number of downloaded symbols from all servers is 4 + 3 + 3 = 10 and each record consists of 6 symbols. Hence the PIR rate is Such as for Serv (1) , its generated answer symbols are {g . Hence, Q ∈ F 6×4 q is the received query matrix of the server S (1) for retrieving W 1 . Since the stored data is fixed at each server, i.e., it is independent of the index of desired record, then the requirement that the query for retrieving each record has the same distribution is equivalent to the requirement that the corresponding answers have the same distribution in the sense of explaining privacy condition. At first, define
where a i , b i , c i are 2-dimensional column vectors respectively for all i ∈ [9] , S 1 , S 2 , S 3 are three matrices privately chosen by the user independently and uniformly from all 9 × 9 permutation matrices. Then the user can iteratively apply Step (a1) and (a2) to generate the queries for all serves, which is displayed in Fig.3 . Note that, from now on we simplify the notations: in Fig.3 , we denote by a i that the related component of the codeword which are obtained by encoding the columns a i with the storage code in the server respectively. That is, if a i appears at the answers of Serv (j) , then it represents the symbol g τ j a i . In the rest of this paper, we will not definitely refer to the storage MDS [N, K] code while reader should always remember that the stored data at each server are the related components of those codewords obtained by using the storage MDS [N, K] code and each column can be recovered from any K components of the corresponding codeword. , which is attaining the capacity for this case. At last, we give a example for the case of N ≥ 2K to introduce the difference for the case N < 2K. Although there is a little of difference in our scheme for the case N < 2K and N ≥ 2K, the principle of design in both cases are iteratively applying Step (a1) and (a2). Let S 1 , S 2 be two matrices privately chosen by the user independently and uniformly from all 5 × 5 binary permutation matrices. Then, define
where a i , b i are 2-dimensional column vectors respectively for all i ∈ [5] .
Similarly as Example 1, the user can iteratively apply Step (a1) and (a2) to generate the queries for all serves, which is displayed in Fig.4 . The correctness condition is guaranteed, because that each desired column can be either directly recovered, i.e., a 1 , a 2 or recovered from all mixed columns by eliminating recoverable interference columns, i.e., a [3:5] . The privacy condition can be verified similarly as in Example 1. The rate of this scheme is 10 14 = 5 7 , which matches the capacity for this case. We have presentend how to iteratively apply Step (a1) and (a2) to generate the queries for all serves through the above three examples. In the next section we will fill in the details for each step.
B. Formal description of the general scheme
Compared with the scheme in [1] , instead of eliminating the symmetry across all servers that was required in [1] , in our scheme the key idea for reducing sub-parcketization is that all servers are divided into two disjoint groups and ensure symmetry across the servers within each group, that is, one group consists of the first N − K servers and the remaining K servers are in the other, here the symmetry across some servers means that such servers have the same query structure. This method has been used to design the PIR scheme for replicated distributed storage system in [21] , here we use this idea again to design the PIR scheme for MDS coded distributed storage system without colluding.
We now start to give a general description of the scheme. Suppose each record
which is a generator matrix of a [N, K] MDS storage code and then the data g
. Suppose the desired record is W θ for some θ ∈ [M ]. Let S 1 , ..., S M be M matrices privately chosen by the user independently and uniformly from allL ×L binary permutation matrices. Then, define
Obviously, when Λ = {θ}, q Λ,λ is a desired column. q Λ,λ is an interference column if θ / ∈ Λ and is a mixed column if {θ} Λ. As pointed in Example 1, the answers given by each server are generated by the three kind columns, that is, consists of 1-sums, 2-sums,...,M -sums. By the record symmetry in Step (a2), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ M and any Serv 
Note that we require all servers in each group satisfy symmetry. Therefore, for 1 ≤ j ≤ M , define j Λ j,h -type j-sums and γ
To explain that for each Λ-type sum how to determine the index of column which is contained in U i , i ∈ Λ and that is a term of such Λ-type sum, we firstly define two functions Dist 1 (Λ, Λ) and Dist 2 (Λ, Γ).
(1) The goal of Dist 1 (Λ, Λ), Λ ⊆ [M ] − {θ} is determining which Λ-type sums are used to generate the Λ-type sums for each server, which satisfy the following conditions: (b1) these Λ-type sums consists of all Λ-type interference columns from all servers, (b2) the output are N tuples, and the i−th tuple consists of γ (i) |Λ| 2 Λ-type sums which is sent to the server Serv (i) for all
. All of Λ-type sums in the i-th tuple are different from all of the Λ-type sums generated by Serv (i) .
For example, for the case θ = 1 in the Example 2, let Λ = {2}, then Dist 1 ({2}, {1, 2}) is
is determining which Λ-type sums are used to generate the Γ-type sums for each server, which satisfy the following conditions: (b3) the output are N tuples, and the i−th tuple consists of γ (i) |Γ| Λ-type sums which is sent to the server Serv (i) for all i ∈ [N ], (b4) each Λ-type sum exactly appears in K tuples. Specially, the input of Dist 2 (·, ·) only has the following both forms, i.e., Λ = Γ ⊆ [M ]−{θ} and Λ = {θ} ⊆ Γ ⊆ [M ]. Actually the first forms are corresponding to the detail operation when applying the Step (a2) and the second form are corresponding to the specific arrangement of the desired columns of U θ when applying the Step (a1). For example,for the case θ = 1 in the Example 2, when Λ = {1} and Γ = {1, 2}, then Dist 2 ({1}, {1, 2}) is
and when Λ = Γ = {2, 3}, then Dist 2 ({2, 3}, {2, 3}) is
Through repeatedly invoking the functions Dist 1 (·, ·) and Dist 2 (·, ·), the following algorithm gives the all queries to each server:
for h = 1 : r j do 4:
for i = 1 : N do 7:
end for 9: end for 10: end for Now let us discuss how to realize the functions Dist 1 (·, ·) and Dist 2 (·, ·). Note that for the function Dist 2 (·, ·), a necessary condition of the requirement (b3), (b4) is
Moreover for the function Dist 1 (·, ·), a necessary condition of the requirement (b1), (b2) is
At first, under the premise of satisfying (30) and (31), the function Dist 1 (Λ, Λ) is easy to realize: suppose |Λ| = j, denote Q Λ by the set of all Λ-type j-sums contained in all servers, actually Q Λ is a union of all N tuples which are the output of
be the set of Λ-type j-sums contained in the server Serv The key to realize the function Dist 2 (Λ, Γ) is to ensure the symmetry of servers in each group and the requirement (b4) simultaneously. Note that for the last K servers, the requirement (b4) and symmetry of servers is easy to realization, thus the main idea of our construction is that to ensure the symmetry of the N − K servers in the first group and require that the Λ-type sums appeared in the first N − K tuples of Dist 2 (Λ, Γ) satisfy the condition (b4). But when N − K < K, the first N − K tuples of Dist 2 (Λ, Γ) cannot satisfy the condition (b4) and we need use the last K tuples. Hence we realize the function Dist 2 (Λ, Γ) for the case N − K ≥ K and N − K < K. Before then we define a index function IniCol(Λ, Γ) = (ℓ j (Λ, Γ)) j∈Λ to give the initial index of the column about U j , j ∈ Λ which are used in the function Dist 2 (Λ, Γ) invoked at the Algorithm1. Hence IniCol(∅, ∅) = 0 and for j ∈ [M ], IniCol({j}, {j}) = 1. Moreover for 1 < ν < M, 1 ≤ h ≤ r ν ,
where j ∈ [M ] − {θ} and χ Λ (·) is the characteristic function of the set Λ, i.e., χ Λ (a) = 1 if a ∈ Λ and χ Λ (a) = 0 if a / ∈ Λ. For example, for the case θ = 1 in the Example 2, IniCol({2, 3}, {2, 3}) = (5, 5) and IniCol({1}, {1, 2}) = 5. Denote q Λ,h = j∈Λ u ℓj+h−1 , where (ℓ j ) j∈Λ = IniCol(Λ, Γ), i.e., ℓ j is the initial index of the column which is used in the function
The first step of Dist 2 (Λ, Γ) is generating the first N − K tuples, that is, arrange t Λ-type sums q Λ,1 , q Λ,2 , ..., q Λ,t to the first N − K servers under the requirement of (b3), (b4), as displayed in the Table 2 . Hence for the Table 2 server
The second step of Dist 2 (Λ, Γ) is generating the last K tuples such that these Λ-type sums satisfy the requirement (b3) and (b4). The generating method is as same as the first step. Note that there are exactly K servers, then each tuple is q t+1 , q t+2 , ..., q t+β |Γ| .
(2) Dist 2 (Λ, Γ) for the case N < 2K At first, Dist 2 (Λ, Γ) generates the first N −K tuples, each is q Λ,1 , q Λ,2 , ..., q Λ,α |Γ| . Note that each Λ-type sum q Λ,h does not satisfy the requirement (b4), since it only appears in N − K tuples at present. Then we need use some K − (N − K) = 2K − N of the last K tulpes to collect it for each Λ-type sum q Λ,h , 1 ≤ h ≤ α |Γ| . Hence we symmetrically send the Λ-type sums q Λ,1 , q Λ,2 , ..., q Λ,α |Γ| to the last K tuples such that each Λ-type sum appears in 2K − N tuples. Note that K ≥ 2K − N and K|(2K − N )α |Γ| which comes from (30), then similarly as the map displayed in the Table 2 , we can realize such arrangement and each of the last K tuples collects
At last, to satisfy the condition (b3), we need send another γ |Γ| β |Γ| − 2K−N K α |Γ| Λ-type sums to each of the last K tuples, i.e., q Λ,α |Γ| +1 , q Λ,α |Γ| +2 , ..., q Λ,α |Γ| +γ |Γ| . Note that γ |Γ| ≥ 0, which comes from (31).
C. Parameters in the scheme
In this section we determine the parameters α j , β j , 1 ≤ j ≤ M which are subject to the constraint (C1), (C2).
and (C2), we obtain the following equations,
Actually from the recursive relations in (33), we get two geometric series, i.e.,
By giving proper initial values to (α 1 , β 1 ) or (α M , β M ), we can obtain the integer solutions of (34) and in turn get the solutions of (33).
, we obtain the integer solutions
It is easy to verify that (35) and (36) respectively give the solution to (33) for the case N ≥ 2T and for the case T < N < 2T . And then in both cases, we can find
At now we calculate the sub-packetization of our scheme described in SectionIV-B, i.e,L. From (32), Hencẽ
Actually the number of invoked columns for each undesired record U j , j ∈ [M ] − {θ} are identical to each other in our scheme, denoted by ℓ. That is, for any j ∈ [M ] − {θ}, 
D. Properties of the scheme
In this section, we verify the scheme described in Section IV-B has the following properties: (1)satisfying correctness and privacy as required in Section II; (2) optimal sub-packetization, i.e., L = Kn M−1 ; (3) achieving the capacity. The correctness condition is easy to verify. From the property of Dist 2 (θ, Γ) for Γ ⊆ [M ] which contain θ, each desired column exactly appears in K servers, which either directly as a column, i.e., Γ = {θ}, or as a term of some mixed column, i.e., {θ} Γ. By the property of Dist 1 , Dist 2 , each interference column can be recoverable, which implies that the user can obtain K related symbols for each desired column. By the MDS property of the storage code, all of the desired columns can be recoverable. On the other hand, the random permutation matrix S θ is invertible. Then our PIR scheme satisfies correctness.
Let us see why privacy condition holds. We denote I i , i ∈ [N ] as the columns index set which consists of the index of columns from U θ involved in the queries of the server Serv (i) . Then it is not difficult to verify that |I i | = ℓ for i ∈ [N ] and here we omit the calculation. Note that for all j ∈ [M ] − {θ}, the number of columns involved for U j in the queries to each server Serv − {θ} are identically distributed. Actually, these matrices are all composed of ℓ linearly independent columns and the random permutations matrices S i 's are unknown to each server, so the Serv (i) cannot tell the difference between the records. Therefore, the privacy is guaranteed.
By the assumption of subpacektization, we have L = KL = Kn M−1 , which achieving the lower bound on L proved in Theorem 7. Therefore our scheme achieves the optimal subpacketization.
Finally, from Table 1 , we can compute the total number of symbols downloaded from all N servers , i.e.
where (a) comes from the identity (37). Hence the PIR rate of our scheme is 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the problem of minimizing the sub-packetization for all linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes for N non-colluding servers. We first prove a lower bound on the sub-packetization for all linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes, and then build a general coded-PIR scheme attaining this lower bound for all N > K ≥ 1 and M > 1. Therefore, the optimal sub-packetization for linear capacity-achieving coded-PIR schemes for non-colluding servers has been settled.
